In the aftermath of the February 2016 North Korean missile launch, a new and tougher set of sanctions is being brought into effect to target the rogue regime of Kim Jong-un. Yet sanctions against the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) have been in-place for a number of years. What’s different this time around?
First, some background:
North Korea has a very long history of regional military provocations: proliferation of military-related items; long-range missile development; weapons of mass destruction programs including tests of nuclear devices, (in 2006, 2009, 2013, and January 2016); maintaining very large military forces – all factors of major concern to the international community. In 2013, the current regime announced a new policy calling for the simultaneous development of its nuclear weapons program and its economy. And it appears that the economic development is meant to prioritize their weapons program over improving life for their citizens. Since 1950, when the US, along with 15 other United Nations member countries, came to the defense of South Korea following an invasion from the North, various sanctions against North Korea have been put in place through the intervening years. The international community has tried to negotiate an end to North Korea’s nuclear and missile development and its export of ballistic missile technology. Those efforts have oscillated through times of great tension and frequent impasse, yielding virtually no progress towards denuclearization.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), has enacted a series of resolutions concerning North Korea. Those mentioned here focus on the imposition of specific sanctions during the period of 2006 through to 2015.
Resolution 1695 banned all UN member states from selling materials or technology for missiles or weapons of mass destruction to North Korea, and from receiving missiles, banned weapons or technology from Pyongyang. It also called on North Korea to refrain from conducting further missile and nuclear tests.
Next, resolution 1718 provided that shipments of cargo going to and from North Korea may be stopped and inspected for weapons of mass destruction or associated items. A ban was placed on imports and exports of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, related materials including spare parts and any other items identified by the UN sanctions committee. UN member states were to freeze the overseas assets of individuals and companies involved with the DPRK’s weapons programs. An international travel ban was also placed on program employees and their families. Interestingly, UN member nations were banned from exporting luxury goods to North Korea.
Then in 2009 resolution 1874 authorized member states to inspect and destroy North Korean cargo on land, sea, and air, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, if suspected of being connected to the DPRK’s nuclear program. This was meant to preclude financial services that could contribute to the nuclear or ballistic missile-related programs. Member states were enjoined not to provide financial assistance to the DPRK nuclear program, or provide loans to the country, except for humanitarian or civil developmental reasons. This resolution expanded the arms embargo on North Korea by banning all weapons exports from this country and most imports (excluding small arms, light weapons and related materials – though requiring member states to notify the Security Council 5 days prior to selling such weapons).
In 2013 resolutions 2087 and 2094 called for stronger enforcement of previously enacted sanctions and added annexes listing North Korean persons and organizations subject to a travel ban and asset freeze. Further, financial restrictions were enacted to impact banking and funding for proliferation-related activities of North Korea.
Yet after all these years and increasingly stringent UN sanctions resolutions, the practical reality is that North Korea has continued developing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. The accumulation of UN sanctions has not changed the behavior of this rogue state, evidenced earlier this year by a fourth nuclear test and another missile launch.
Now, on March 2nd, the United Nations has acted again. Resolution 2270 has just been approved by the UN Security Council. If fully implemented, it will strangle the economic means to carry out the North Korean nuclear and missile development program.
Here are some important elements that are different about these latest UN sanctions:
- Resolution 2270 was carefully negotiated in advance with China, and thus carries greater support from this key country, more than ever before.
- All member countries must inspect all cargo transiting through their ports on the way to or from North Korea to eliminate the flow of banned items. (This was only optional in the past).
- Severe restrictions are placed upon chartering or operating vessels and aircraft in order to limit the ability of North Korea to transfer UN-prohibited items.
- There are new measures to specifically target the ability of North Korea to evade or circumvent sanctions, (to preclude methods used in the past).
- Imposition of new industry-sector sanctions, cutting off exports of coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, and rare earth minerals and suspending the supply of aviation fuel and rocket fuel to this country.
- Greatly expanded financial sanctions target North Korea banking institutions globally and more thoroughly, accompanied by freezing of more assets; in order to place a much tighter squeeze upon funding for proliferation-related activities.
- Prohibiting nations from providing training to North Korean nationals in fields that could advance the nation’s missile and nuclear programs, such as aerospace engineering and advanced computer simulation, plus directing the expulsion of North Korean diplomats and citizens engaged in illicit activities.
As North Korea’s closest ally, if China more closely adheres to this new resolution, then perhaps it will move Kim Jon-un to change course. His first response was to fire off some short range missiles into the ocean. Time will tell.